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Abstract 
The Amlon case reflects an unfair phenomenon that the 
winning party gets a successful award but the enforcement 
of the award is refused by all relevant countries, and there 
are no other recourse means or remedies available for the 
winning party. We may call this embarrassing situation of 
the winning party in international commercial arbitration 
as Amlon Dilemma. To work out this dilemma, the New 
York Convention and national arbitration laws should take 
some measures, such as adopting the principle of waiver in 
the proceedings of refusing enforcement, coordinating the 
proceedings of setting aside in the country of the arbitral 
forum and the proceedings of refusing enforcement in 
other countries, and endowing the decision of refusing 
enforcement made by the court of a country outside the 
arbitral forum with the effect of invalidating the award in 
that country.
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INTRODUCTION
In international commercial arbitration, there is a 
famous case, the outcome of which is called Hilmarton 
Nightmare. It reflects the phenomenon that the award 
has been set aside in the country of the arbitral forum 
but is still enforced in other countries. The Hilmarton 
case has generated controversial debate in the circle of 
international arbitration. To the contrary of the Hilmarton 
Nightmare, the author discovers in his practice another 
kind of phenomenon which is unfair and unendurable for 
the winning party of the arbitral proceedings. That is, the 
enforcement of the award is refused by the courts of all 
possible countries where the losing party has assets for 
enforcement because there exist one or more grounds for 
refusal as enumerated in Article V(1) of the New York 
Convention, whereas the winning party of the arbitral 
proceedings eventually could neither submit the dispute 
for re-arbitration nor commence litigations in any national 
court because the original award has not been set aside and 
still remains valid. The author calls this unfair phenomenon 
as the Amlon Dilemma, following the name of the winning 
party of the case. The Amlon Dilemma frustrates the 
objectives of the parties to international arbitration and 
should be wiped out. This article purports to analyze this 
dilemma and propose some possible resolutions.
1.  THE FACTS OF THE AMLON CASE
1.1  The Contract and the Dispute Between the 
Parties
On 7th November 2005, Amlon Metals Ltd (an English 
company, hereafter referred to as “the Claimant”), 
concluded a contract to sell one lot of copper concentrate 
ore to Yunnan Nickel and Cobalt Co., Ltd (a Chinese 
company, hereafter referred to as “the first respondent”) 
and Kunming Railway Bureau Import and Export 
Corporation (the agent of the first respondent, hereafter 
refereed to as “the second respondent”). Amongst other 
clauses, Article 19 of the Contract provides that all 
disputes arising under the Contract shall be determined 
under the Rules of the London Court of International 
Arbitration by two arbitrators and an umpire to be 
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appointed pursuant to the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
Article 20 stipulates that all disputes shall be exclusively 
determined by Hong Kong International Arbitration 
Centre (HKIAC) in Hong Kong in accordance with 
English laws.
From 9th April to 3rd May 2006, six shipments of the 
contracted goods arrived successively at Hekou, China. 
Three shipments were classified into HS26203000 
(mixture mainly containing copper, which is forbidden 
to be imported under Chinese Laws) and ordered to 
be returned to the seller by Hekou Customs. The two 
respondents applied to Kunming Customs for re-
inspection and re-classification. Upon the respondents’ 
application, commitment not to use the goods before the 
Customs making the final decision, depositing a sum of 
security, and approved by Hekou Customs, all the goods 
were transported to and stored in the first respondent’s 
warehouse under the supervision of the Customs. In such 
a situation, the respondents refused to pay the claimant 
the already-agreed outstanding balance for the three 
shipments in a total sum of about USD445,000, and a 
dispute arose between the parties. 
1.2  The Arbitral Proceedings and the Award
On 7th November 2006, the claimant’s solicitor wrote 
to the respondents, demanding to submit the dispute for 
arbitration to HKIAC. This letter proposes to appoint Mr. 
Russell Coleman SC as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate 
the dispute in accordance with procedural rules which 
the arbitrator may consider fit, and presumes that the 
respondents have accepted the proposal if they do not 
response otherwise within 14 days. On 12th December 
2006, the first respondent, on behalf of itself and the 
second respondent, wrote to the claimant’s solicitor, 
pleading that the dispute cannot be arbitrated since 
the Customs has not made the final decision, without 
mentioning the proposal made by the claimant’s solicitor. 
On 2nd May 2007, HKIAC appointed Mr. Russell 
Coleman SC as the sole arbitrator, upon the claimant’s 
application made on 16th March 2007. After the 
composition of the tribunal, the arbitrator issued two 
orders for directions, which determined, among other 
procedural matters, that the (1993) Domestic Arbitration 
Rules of the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
with some necessary amendments shall apply to the 
arbitration. Meanwhile, the arbitrator sent several faxes to 
the respondents, urging them to participate in the arbitral 
proceedings. Both respondents did not response to these 
faxes and did not appear in the arbitral proceedings. 
Just during this course, the first respondent violated its 
commitment to the Customs and used all the copper ore 
in production. On 12th June 2007, Hekou Customs issued 
an administrative punishment decree, increasing the 
import tax from 13% to 21% (RMB 572,309 higher than 
normal), and fining the two respondents in a total sum of 
RMB424,000. So on 6th August 2007, the first respondent 
wrote to the claimant’s solicitor, pleading once again that 
the dispute could not be arbitrated because the loss which 
they suffered surpassed that payable to the claimant.
On 10th March 2008, the arbitrator issued his final 
award, declaring that the claimant succeeds and the two 
respondents are jointly and severally liable to the claimant 
for the principal and the interest already accrued and to 
be accrued till the payment, as well as all arbitration cost, 
including the claimant’s cost and the arbitrator’s fees.
1.3  The Post-Arbitration Proceedings
After the award was served, the first respondent cancelled 
its registration and dissolved immediately to escape the 
debt. The second respondent refused to perform the award 
voluntarily. Learning that it has no assets outside the 
Mainland China, the author advised the second respondent 
not to apply for setting aside the award in Hong Kong, but 
just to wait for the claimant to apply for enforcement in 
the Mainland.
On 1st September 2008, the claimant applied to 
Kunming Middle People’s Court for recognition 
and enforcement of the award. Acting as the second 
respondent’s solicitor, the author pleaded to the Court 
that the recognition and enforcement must be refused on 
the grounds that the composition of the arbitral tribunal 
and the procedural rules applied by the arbitrator are 
not in conformity with the parties’ agreement, as well 
as the enforcement of the award would violate China’s 
social public interest1 because the award undisguisedly 
denied the decision on classification of the goods and the 
administrative punishment decree issued by the Chinese 
Customs. After reporting to and being confirmed by the 
Supreme People’s Court,2 Kunming Middle People’s 
Court made its final decision on 5th November 2009, 
ruling not to enforce the award, but only on the ground 
that the composition of the arbitral tribunal is not in 
conformity with the parties’ agreement.3
On 29th July 2010, the claimant’s solicitor wrote to 
the respondents, demanding to submit the dispute for re-
arbitration in HKIAC and requesting the respondents to 
appoint an arbitrator. Being authorized by and on behalf of 
1 Social public interest is the synonym of public policy or public 
order often used in Chinese laws.
2 According to the Notice on Several Issues Regarding the Handling 
by the People’s Courts of Certain Issues Pertaining to Foreign-
Related Arbitration and Foreign Arbitration issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court on and effective from 28th Aug. 1995, if the Middle 
People’s Court contemplates that a foreign arbitral award sought 
for recognition and enforcement is not in compliance with the 
provisions of international conventions acceded to by China, it must, 
before deciding to refuse the recognition and enforcement, report 
its findings to the Higher People’s Court in the same jurisdiction for 
review. If the Higher People’s Court also agrees with the findings 
that recognition and enforcement should be refused, it should report 
its findings to the Supreme People’s Court. Only after the Supreme 
People’s Court confirms the findings, can the Middle People’s Court 
rule to refuse the recognition and enforcement of the award.
3 See (2008) Kun Non-Enforcement No. 48-1, 5th Nov. 2009.
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the second respondent, the author wrote to the claimant’s 
solicitor and HKIAC, holding that the dispute cannot be 
re-arbitrated and HKIAC cannot re-exercise jurisdiction 
on the same dispute because the award has not been set 
aside. Till now, there is no information from either the 
claimant or HKIAC. 
2.  THE DILEMMA OF THE WINNING 
PARTY IN THE AMLON CASE
According to the Contract, the final price payable to the 
seller was to be determined on the content of copper, with 
the lowest of the four LME official quotations for copper 
grade A as the reference price. The content of copper shall 
be assayed independently by the seller’s representative 
and the buyer’s representative. If the difference between 
the two assaying results is within 0.50 units, the exact 
mean value shall be taken as the agreed content of 
copper for determining the final price. In case of greater 
difference, an umpire assaying shall be made. As to the 
quality, the Contract only requires that the copper ore 
should be free from impurities deleterious to normal 
smelting process. All these provisions of the Contract 
make clear that the content of copper is the main or only 
concern of the buyers. Before the dispute arose, both 
parties had reached agreement on the content of copper 
and the final price payable to the seller. The facts that 
the respondents applied to the Customs for re-inspection 
and re-classification and that the first respondent violated 
its commitment to the Customs and used the goods in 
production showed that the respondents themselves were 
satisfied with the goods delivered and didn’t want to 
return the goods to the seller. It can be concluded that the 
claimant did not breach the Contract, the respondents’ 
loss suffered from higher import tax and fine was caused 
completely by their own violation against the decision and 
order of the Customs. Therefore, I believe undoubtedly 
that the claimant should win the case and the arbitral 
award is correct in substance. However, Amlon, the 
winning party of the arbitral proceedings, encounters a 
dilemma which cannot be resolved under the present legal 
systems of international commercial arbitration.
2.1  The Award Cannot Be Enforced Anywhere
On one hand, the recognition and enforcement of the award 
should be refused, because the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal and the procedural rules applied in the arbitral 
proceedings are inconsistent with the parties’ agreement. 
Article 19 of the Contract stipulates clearly that the 
arbitral tribunal shall consist of two arbitrators and an 
umpire to be appointed under the provisions of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996, and the arbitral proceedings shall 
be conducted in accordance with the Rules of the London 
Court of International Arbitration. According to the 
English Arbitration Act 1996, in case each of two parties 
to an arbitration agreement is to appoint an arbitrator, only 
when one party (“the party in default”) refuses to do so 
or fails to do so within the time specified, may the other 
party, having duly appointed his arbitrator, give notice in 
writing to the party in default that he proposes to appoint 
his arbitrator to act as sole arbitrator.4 But unfortunately, 
when commencing the arbitral proceedings, the claimant 
and its solicitor didn’t request the respondents to appoint 
an arbitrator, but immediately proposed to appoint a 
sole arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute in accordance 
with whatever procedural rules which the arbitrator 
may consider fit. This proposal can only amount to an 
offer to amend the relevant provisions of the original 
Contract. What is even worse is that the claimant and its 
solicitor mistakenly presumed that the respondents had 
accepted its proposal if they didn’t object to it within 
14 days. However, the respondents’ silence could never 
constitute an acceptance and the original Contract could 
never be modified by the claimant’s unilateral proposal. 
Therefore, even the arbitrator himself had to acknowledge 
in the arbitral award that, though no specific objection 
was raised by the respondents, the appointment was 
not expressly agreed to by the respondents. Since the 
relevant provisions of the original Contract regarding to 
the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the procedural 
rules to be applied have not been changed by the 
claimant’s unilateral proposal, both HKIAC’s appointing 
a sole arbitrator and the arbitrator’s decision to apply the 
(1993) Domestic Arbitration Rules of HKIAC are not 
consistent with the parties’ agreement. 
According to the Arrangement between the Mainland 
and Hong Kong SAR Concerning the Mutual Recognition 
and Enforcement of Arbitration Awards, if the respondent5 
submits evidence proving that the composition of the 
arbitral tribunal or the procedure is not consistent with 
the parties’ agreement, or, in the absence of such an 
agreement, is not in accordance with the laws of the 
arbitration seat, the relevant people’s court may rule not 
to enforce the award.6 Though this Arrangement provides 
that the court may (not “should”) rule not to enforce 
the award if any of the grounds enumerated in Article 7 
thereof is established, the Notice on the Implementation of 
China’s Accession to the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards issued by 
the Supreme People’s Court requires the court to reject 
the application for enforcement if any of the grounds 
enumerated in Article V of the New York Convention 
has been proved to exist.7 In practice, the Chinese courts 
4 See Section 17(1) of the English Arbitration Act 1996.
5 It refers to the party against whom the enforcement is sought.
6 See Article 7 of the Arrangement between the Mainland and Hong 
Kong SAR Concerning the Mutual Recognition and Enforcement 
of Arbitration Awards. The grounds to refuse the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards enumerated in this Arrangement are 
the same as those in the New York Convention.
7 See Article 4 of the Notice on the Implementation of China’s 
Accession to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
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generally have no discretion in determining whether or 
not to enforce a foreign award. Therefore, the ruling of 
Kunming Middle People’s Court not to enforce the award 
is undoubtedly correct. 
What can Amlon do after the enforcement of the award 
is refused by the court of the Mainland? Theoretically, the 
principle of res judicata does not apply in the recognition 
and enforcement context between countries, refusal 
of recognition or enforcement in one country does not 
generally bar the winning party from seeking recognition 
or enforcement in another country (Herbert, Patricia, 
Dirk & Nicola, 2010, p.215). Therefore, Amlon may seek 
recognition and enforcement in other countries and areas 
where the respondents may have assets for enforcement. 
But the problem is that the respondents only have assets 
in Mainland China, and Amlon can not, in fact, seek 
enforcement in other countries or areas. 
Even if the respondents have assets in other countries 
and Amlon applies to courts of other countries for 
recognition and enforcement, the recognition and 
enforcement may probably be denied by other countries, 
in the context that most countries have acceded to 
the New York Convention and the grounds to refuse 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards 
are uniform.8 Of course, as some commentators point 
out, this “much depends upon the reason for which 
enforcement was refused. If, for example, enforcement 
was refused for local public policy considerations, it may 
be possible to find another country in which the same 
considerations do not apply. However, if enforcement 
was refused because of failure by the arbitral tribunal to 
give the losing party an opportunity to present its case, 
it may not be possible to enforce the award elsewhere, 
since other courts may take the same view” (Nigel, 
Constantine, Alan, & Martin,  2009, p.632). In broader 
words, if the enforcement of an award is refused by one 
country on the grounds as enumerated in Article V(2) of 
the New York Convention, the award might be enforced 
by other countries because the perceptions on public 
policy and the legal provision on arbitrability vary from 
country to country.9 If the enforcement of an award 
is refused by one country on one or more grounds as 
enumerated in Article V (1) of the New York Convention, 
it might be refused by all other countries. It is not 
difficult to imagine such a scenario as in the Amlon case 
that the winning party has obtained a successful award, 
but the award cannot be enforced anywhere.
of Foreign Arbitral Awards issued by the Supreme People’s Court on 
10th April 1987.
8 Up to now, 149 countries have acceded to the New York 
Convention. http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts /
arbitration/ NYConvention_status.html. 2013-10-18.
9 If it is such a case, the Amlon Dilemma will not occur. Therefore, 
refusing enforcement on the grounds of Article V (2) of the New 
York Convention will be excluded in the forthcoming parts of this 
article.
2.2  The Winning Party Has no Other Recourse 
Means or Remedies
On the other hand, Amlon has no other recourse means 
or remedies to take back what it is entitled to under the 
Contract, just because the arbitral award has not been set 
aside and remains valid.
The New York Convention, the Model Law,10 and 
almost all national arbitration laws11 keep silent on the legal 
consequence of refusal of the recognition and enforcement 
of an award. Little academic authority addresses this issue. 
But it is commonly accepted that, if the recognition and 
enforcement of an award is denied in a national court 
outside the place of arbitration, the award remains in 
existence as a binding award (Gary, 2009, p.2673). Since 
the award still remains valid and binding on both parties, 
a logic consequence is that the issues decided in the award 
with regard to the facts upon which a party based its 
claim may not be reopened before the same, or any other 
arbitral tribunal, or any national court, unless and until 
the award is successfully challenged before a competent 
court (Jean-Louis, Gerald, & Jean, 2009, p.187).12 So in the 
Amlon case, when Amlon sought to submit the dispute to 
HKIAC for re-arbitration, the respondent and its solicitor 
firmly insisted that the dispute cannot be re-arbitrated and 
objected to HKIAC’s re-assuming jurisdiction. Because of 
the respondent’s objection, Amlon finally had to abandon 
its attempt for re-arbitration.
An award set aside in the seat ceases to exist 
(Emmanuel, 2010, p.135). If the award has been set aside 
completely on the basis that the arbitration agreement was 
null and void, resort to litigation might be considered, if 
there could be no problems of time limits. If the award 
has been set aside for procedural defects, the arbitration 
agreement will usually (but not always) still be effective, 
the dispute can be submitted to arbitration, providing 
the claim is not time-barred (Nigel, Constantine, Alan, 
& Martin, 2009, p.619). Therefore, a possible option for 
Amlon and other winning parties under the same situation 
might be to apply to the court of the arbitration seat to 
10 Up to now, legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law has 
been enacted in nearly 90 countries and territories worldwide, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ arbitration/1985Model_ 
arbitration_status.html. 2013-10-18.
11 See e.g., the English Arbitration Act 1996, the Swedish 
Arbitration Act 1999, the Danish Arbitration Act 2005, German 
Arbitration Law 1998, the Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration of Greece 1999, the Arbitration Ordinance of Hong Kong 
1997, the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, the Code 
of Civil Procedure of Germany, Swiss Private International Law 
Act 1987, the Australian International Arbitration Act 1974, Law 
of the Russian Federation on International Commercial Arbitration 
1993, the Japanese Arbitration Law 2003. All these national laws 
do not contain provisions on the legal consequence of refusal of 
enforcement.
12 But there are also some scholars vaguely holding that the winning 
party will probably have no option but to recommence arbitral 
proceedings in case the recognition and enforcement of the award is 
refused, assuming that the right to do so has not been lost by lapse 
of time (Nigel,  Constantine, Alan, & Martin, 2009, P.632).
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set aside the award. However, in practice, the winning 
party will not actively set a motion to set aside the award, 
because the award is in its favor and it is satisfied with the 
award. Only after the recognition and enforcement of the 
award is refused in one or all relevant countries, may the 
winning party desire to apply to set aside the award. But 
it cannot do so, because the time limit for setting aside the 
award must have already lapsed.13
To summarize, the Amlon Dilemma in international 
commercial arbitration is that the winning party should 
win the case in substance and does get a successful award, 
but the award cannot be enforced anywhere because there 
exists one or more circumstances as enumerated in Article 
V (1) of the New York Convention, and the winning party 
has no other recourse means or remedies because the award 
has not been set aside by the court of the arbitral forum and 
still remains valid.
3.  RESOLUTIONS TO THE AMLON 
DILEMMA
The most significant advantages of international 
arbitration are neutrality of the arbitral forum and 
the enforceability of international arbitration award 
(Christopher, & Richard, 2005, p.19). Judges in most 
countries will in fact be more sympathetic to their 
countrymen than to foreigners (William,, & Noah, 2000, 
p.539). By choosing neutral arbitrators and conducting the 
proceedings in a neutral place, it is more likely to achieve 
a fair and just award in international arbitration. The New 
York Convention and favorable arbitration legislation 
in many countries provide a “pro-enforcement” regime, 
with expedited recognition procedures and only limited 
grounds for denying recognition to an arbitral award 
(Gary, 2009, p.78). This makes it much easier to enforce 
an arbitral award than to enforce a court judgment in other 
countries outside the forum. However, if, as in the Amlon 
case, an arbitral award is correct and fair in substance but 
can not be recognized and enforced anywhere because 
of jurisdictional or procedural defects, whereas the 
winning party has no other recourse means or remedies, 
these advantages of international arbitration would be 
frustrated. This is unfair to the winning party. Both 
international conventions and national legislations should 
take measures to work out this dilemma.
3.1  To Apply the Principle of Waiver to the 
Proceedings of Refusing Enforcement
International commercial arbitration is the creature of the 
autonomy of the will of the parties. It is elementary that 
jurisdictional objections may be waived. If a party does 
13 Most national laws require the challenge to be launched within 
weeks rather than months after the time limits have started to run. 
Periods for bringing a claim to set aside an award may be as short as 
28 days, often three months and occasionally as long as six months 
(Julian, Loukas, & Stefan, 2003, p.672).
not challenge the existence or validity of the putative 
agreement to arbitrate relatively early in the arbitral 
proceedings, then subsequent objections, including in 
annulment proceedings, will be precluded (Gary, 2009, 
p.2573). In international commercial arbitration, there is 
in general no pre-established procedural code, applicable 
generally in arbitral proceedings, but instead a procedure 
resulting from the parties’ agreements. So the parties are 
required to raise their objections to any non-compliance 
with the arbitration procedure or agreement promptly. 
Otherwise, they may not invoke such non-compliance 
as a ground for setting aside the award or as a reason for 
refusing its recognition and enforcement (UNCITRAL 
secretariat, 2012, p.19). 
Though the principle of waiver is theoretically 
accepted, there are no specific references in the provisions 
of most national arbitration laws dealing with waiver 
of the right to challenge an award, only several national 
laws containing provisions concerning waiver of the 
right to challenge either in the context of not contesting 
the invalidity of arbitration agreement or challenging 
arbitrators,14 and few arbitration laws containing specific 
rules on waiver of the right to challenge an award.15 Even 
in these national laws, it seems that the principle of waiver 
is applied only to the proceedings of setting aside, but not 
to the proceedings of refusing enforcement.16
In order to promote the enforcement of arbitral 
awards, the New York Convention permits a national 
court to refuse the recognition and enforcement of an 
award only if one of the grounds enumerated in Article 
V is established. The English version of the Convention 
employs a permissive rather than mandatory language: 
enforcement “may be “refused. So some scholars hold 
that, even if the party against whom the award is invoked 
proves the existence of one of the grounds for refusal 
of enforcement, the court still has a certain discretion to 
overrule the defense and to grant the enforcement of the 
award in the case where the respondent can be deemed 
to be estopped from invoking the ground for refusal 
(Albert, 1981, p.256).17 In simple words, the principle 
of waiver may be applied to the proceedings of refusing 
enforcement. But the different translations in other official 
languages of Article Ⅴof the Convention have generated 
controversy about whether courts have discretion 
14 See, e.g., Article 16(2) of UNCITRAL Model Law, Section 73(1) 
of the English Arbitration Act, Article 1027 of CCP of Netherlands.
15 See, e.g., Article 4 of UNCITRAL Model Law, Section 73(1) 
of the English Arbitration Act, Article 1704(4) of Judicial Code of 
Belgium.
16 For example, Section 73(1) (loss of right to object) is contained in 
PartⅠof the English Arbitration Act 1996, but the rules concerning 
enforcement of foreign awards are contained in Part Ⅲ of the 
Act, so it seems that the principle of waiver does not apply to the 
proceedings of refusing enforcement of foreign awards.
17 Gary B. Born also holds that the objection under Article V1(a), 
(b), (d) can be waived if the party fails to raise them during the 
arbitration (Gary, 2009, p.2761, p.2777, p.2796).
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to enforce or recognize foreign awards. Some other 
commentators hold that Article Ⅴ seeks to standardize 
and harmonize the grounds for refusal of recognition 
and enforcement, granting discretionary authority to 
the judges deciding recognition and enforcement issues 
would contradict the purpose of the Convention, the better 
view is that courts must deny recognition if one of the 
defenses enumerated in Article Ⅴ has been established 
(Herbert, Patricia, Dirk, & Nicola, 2010, p.208). So in the 
practice in many jurisdiction, such as in Mainland China, 
the courts must refuse and always do refuse foreign 
arbitral awards if one of the grounds of Article Ⅴ of the 
Convention is established, no matter the respondent has 
raised its objections or not in the arbitral proceedings.18
The principle of waiver demands the parties of 
arbitral proceedings to raise promptly their objections to 
the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction and the irregularities 
of the arbitral procedures, and prevents any party from 
attacking the arbitral award when finding the award 
is against it. If this principle is adopted by all national 
arbitration laws, and if it is clearly incorporated into 
the New York Convention and uniformly interpreted by 
all national courts, the probability that an award will 
be set aside or the enforcement will be refused would 
be considerably reduced. Especially, the losing party 
would not wait and attack the award at the last minute, 
that is at the enforcing stage, as in the Amlon case, and 
the occurrence of the Amlon Dilemma would decrease 
correspondingly. Of course, even if the party has raised 
its objections during the arbitral proceedings, the arbitral 
tribunal may make wrong decisions and deny the 
objection. In such cases, there may still exist the grounds 
to refuse the enforcement of the award, the enforcement 
of the award may still be refused anywhere. So adopting 
the principle of waiver cannot eliminate completely the 
occurrence of the Amlon Dilemma.
3.2  To Coordinate the Proceedings of Refusing 
Enforcement and the Proceedings of Setting 
Aside
After an award is rendered, if there is no internal appeal 
mechanism available, the distressed party generally 
has two choices, either challenging the award in the 
courts of the arbitration seat (applying for setting aside 
the award in most jurisdictions), or seeking to resist 
the enforcement when the successful party initiates 
enforcement proceedings before a court in another 
country outside the arbitration seat (Julian, Loukas, & 
Stefan, 2003, p.663). Under the present legal systems of 
international arbitration, though the grounds to set aside 
an award are the same as or similar to the grounds to 
18 See Article 4 of the Notice on the Implementation of China’s 
Accession to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards issued by the Supreme People’s Court on 
10th Apr. 1987.
refuse the enforcement of an award,19 the two proceedings 
are generally independent from each other. This produces 
the result that the two separate state courts have authority 
to decide issues which are frequently the same and 
may decide them in a completely different and possibly 
conflicting way (Mauro, 2003, p.924).
The New York Convention only provides that 
recognition and enforcement of the award may be (but not 
“shall be”) refused if it has been set aside by a competent 
authority of the country in which or under the law of which 
the award was made. Therefore, in practice, on one hand, 
even if an award has been set aside by the court in the 
arbitration seat, it may still be recognized and enforced in 
other countries,20 causing such a result as the Hilmarton 
Nightmare (Hamid, 1997, pp.20-25). The Convention 
doesn’t demand that member countries should recognize 
and enforce the award if the losing party didn’t apply for 
setting aside it or the application was denied.21 So on the 
other hand, even if the losing party has not applied for 
setting aside the award or failed in the proceedings of 
setting aside in the arbitration seat, it still has chances to 
resist the enforcement of the award when the winning party 
seeks enforcement in other jurisdictions, the court in other 
jurisdictions may still refuse the enforcement of the award, 
thus causing the occurrence of the Amlon Dilemma.
To solve the Hilmarton Nightmare, scholars have raised 
various resolutions. Some scholars propose to distinguish 
19 For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law suggests adopting 
the same rules. The grounds to set aside an award listed in many 
national arbitration laws are the same as those in Article Ⅴ of the 
New York Convention.
20 For example, the Chromalloy case decided by the U.S. courts, 
the Hilmarton Case decided by the French Courts. For comments 
on the practice of the U.S. courts and the French courts, please 
see Christopher Koch, The Enforcement of Awards Annulled in 
Their Place of Origin: The French and U.S. Experience, Journal 
of International Arbitration, 26(2),2009, 267–292. As some 
commentators point out, though most jurisdictions around the 
world are likely to refuse enforcement of an award that has been set 
aside in another country, this is not the universal position. Courts 
in certain countries have been receptive in the past to enforcing 
awards set aside elsewhere based on local annulment standards, and 
this trend may grow as international arbitration around the world 
becomes more transnational in character and less deferential towards 
the place of arbitration (Michael, & John, 2010, p.357).
21 The author finds provisions on the relationship between these two 
proceedings only in the Philippines Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Act of 2004. Section 44 of this Act provides that a foreign arbitral 
award when confirmed by a court of a foreign country, shall be 
recognized and enforced as a foreign arbitral award and not a 
judgment of a foreign court. In practice, different courts hold 
different attitudes in this regard. Some courts have considered 
whether a party resisting recognition of an award challenged the 
procedural conduct of an arbitration in an annulment action in the 
arbitral seat. A few courts have suggested that a party will not be 
required to seek judicial review in the arbitral seat where doing 
so would be futile. Some courts have held that an award debtor is 
bound by decisions rendered in annulment proceedings rejecting its 
procedural objections. Other national courts have held that they are 
not bound in recognition proceedings by the findings of courts in the 
arbitral seat made in annulment proceedings (Gary, 2009, pp.2762-
2763).
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between grounds for refusal, those of a local nature should 
be disregarded and only those of an international nature 
should be kept (Jan, 1998, p.14). Some scholars suggest 
that, if an award is rendered in accordance with the 
procedural laws of the arbitration seat, it must be treated 
as a domestic award and does not exist anymore and shall 
not be enforced in other jurisdictions once it is set aside 
by the court of the arbitration seat; where the situation is 
international, no interest of the state in which the award 
was issued and set aside justifies that enforcement of such 
annulled award be refused outside its borders (Pierre, 
1999, pp.38-43). Some scholars propose to establish an 
internal arbitral appellate system for the parties to choose 
and national judicial remedies to be waivered (William,  & 
Noah, 2000, pp.551-564). Some scholars even envisage 
providing for an International Arbitral Court of Appeal 
to review the awards, to replace all national setting aside 
and enforcement proceedings (Mauro, 2003, pp.980-984). 
These proposals are creative and helpful to achieve the 
consistency of judicial review by different national courts 
and to eliminate the Hilmarton Nightmare, but they are 
either impractical, such as distinguishing the nature of 
the grounds for refusal, or unrealistic, such as abolishing 
judicial review by national court or establishing a supra-
national appellate court (Hamid, 2002, pp.141-165).
To resolve the Amlon Dilemma, it is advisable to 
coordinate the proceedings of setting aside in the court 
of the arbitration seat and the proceedings of refusing 
enforcement in other states. In a logic order, the 
proceedings of setting aside in the arbitration seat take 
place before and so should be prior to the proceedings of 
enforcement in other states. Therefore, if the losing party 
is not satisfied with the award, it should first apply to the 
court in the arbitration seat for setting aside the award. 
If it failed to do so, it would be barred from raising any 
objections in the forthcoming proceedings of enforcement 
in other countries. Only if it has applied for setting aside 
the award but the application was wrongly denied by the 
court of the arbitral forum, can it resist the enforcement 
of the award in the enforcement proceedings on the same 
ground as raised in the proceedings of setting aside. 
This would force the losing party to challenge the award 
before the court of the arbitration seat immediately after 
the award is rendered if it is not satisfied with the award, 
rather than to wait and attack the award at the last stage 
when the winning party seeks enforcement in other 
jurisdictions. If such provisions be incorporated into the 
New York Convention or all national laws, the possibility 
of the Amlon Dilemma could be considerably reduced, 
although could not be completely eliminated. 
3.3  To Clarify the Legal Consequence of Refusal 
of Enforcement
The above two suggestions can only diminish, but not 
eliminate, the probability of the occurrence of Amelon 
Dilemma. A better solution which can completely 
prevent the occurrence of Amlon Dilemma is to grant 
the decision of refusal of enforcement made by the court 
in a jurisdiction outside the arbitral forum with the legal 
consequence of invalidating the award in that jurisdiction.
As stated above, theoretically, if the recognition and 
enforcement of an award is refused by the court in a 
country outside the arbitral forum, the award still remains 
valid and the winning party can seek recognition and 
enforcement in another country.22 Maybe it is because 
of this assumption, the New York Convention, the 
Model Law and most national laws only provide for the 
circumstances under which the enforcement of an award 
may be refused, but do not expressly provide for the legal 
consequence of refusal of enforcement, especially the 
legal consequence in the country when the enforcement is 
refused. This theory and practice is not enough. It ignores 
the situation that the recognition and enforcement of an 
award may be refused by the courts of all countries where 
the losing party has enforceable assets and the award 
eventually turns out to be unenforceable. This is the main 
reason that causes the Amlon Dilemma.
The Chinese legislation and practice is preferable. In 
both the Chinese Civil Procedure Law and the Chinese 
Arbitration Law, there are provisions concerning non-
enforcement by the people’s court of domestic or foreign-
related arbitral awards rendered in Mainland China, which 
is similar to but different from refusing the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards (Shi, 2013). According to these 
provisions, if a domestic or foreign-related arbitral award 
is decided by a Chinese people’s court not to be enforced, 
the parties of the award may submit the dispute for re-
arbitration if a new arbitration agreement can be reached 
or otherwise file a lawsuit before the competent people’s 
court.23 Under this regime, where the enforcement of an 
award is refused, the parties can seek remedies through 
re-arbitration or litigation. Similarly, According to the 
New Code of Civil Procedure, if the award were to be 
refused recognition or enforcement on the grounds that 
the arbitrator had ruled “in the absence of an arbitration 
agreement or on the basis of an agreement that was void 
or had expired”, it would be possible to submit the same 
dispute to the French courts, provided that the courts have 
international jurisdiction to hear the case (Emmanuel, & 
John, 1999, p.780).
Although the regime of non-enforcement in Chinese 
laws is criticized by some Chinese scholars (e.g., An, 
C., 1995, pp.372-373), similar legal consequence of 
refusal of enforcement can be introduced into the New 
York Convention to avoid the Amlon Dilemma. The 
Convention should provide that if the recognition and 
enforcement of an award is refused by the court of a 
22 See infra para. 3 of part Ⅱ(ⅱ).
23 See Articles 273-275 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, as amended on August 31, 2012, and Articles 63 
and 71 of the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Amlon Dilemma: Another Hilmarton Nightmare in 
International Commercial Arbitration
36
country outside the arbitral forum, the parties, especially 
the willing party of the arbitral proceedings, shall have the 
right to take actions over the original disputes in the court 
of that country.24 If so, when the award is not set aside in 
the country of the arbitral forum but its enforcement is 
refused by one or all relevant countries, the winning party 
could have a chance to commence legal proceedings to 
get a judgment in its favor in the courts in those countries. 
By this way, the occurrence of the Amlon Dilemma could 
be completely avoided.
CONCLUSION
Under the present legal systems of international 
commercial arbitration, the judicial review in the 
proceedings of refusing enforcement is separate from the 
judicial review in the proceedings of setting aside. Lack of 
coordination between these two proceedings could result 
in not only the Hilmarton Nightmare where an award 
which has been set aside in the country of the arbitral 
forum is still recognized and enforced in other countries, 
but also the Amlon Dilemma where an award which has 
not been set aside in the country of the arbitral forum is 
denied enforcement in all other relevant countries without 
any recourse means or remedies available for the winning 
party of the arbitral proceedings. The Amlon Dilemma 
frustrates the objectives of the parties to an international 
arbitration for a neutral forum and an enforceable award. 
To work out this dilemma, it is advisable for the New 
York Convention and national arbitration laws to adopt the 
principle of waiver both in the setting aside proceedings 
and the enforcement proceedings, place the proceedings 
of setting aside in a position prior to the proceedings of 
refusing enforcement, and endow the decision of refusal 
of enforcement made by the court in a country outside the 
arbitral forum with the legal consequence of invalidating 
the award in that country.
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